Wednesday, 27 April 2016

displacement behaviour and cognitive dissonance

By unknown, Fair use, https://en.wikipedia.org




The following extract is taken from a current research outline, which aims to bring together the ethological idea of self-directed actions and concepts from social psychology - in this case,  Leon Festinger's concept of Cognitive Dissonance.

In terms of psychological concepts, perhaps the closest social psychology has come to recognising the cognitive processes pertaining to displacement behaviour is Festinger's notion of cognitive dissonance. Festinger's theory (1962) aims to understand mental discomfort and how it is regulated. Cognitive dissonance is a form of tension where a conflict exists between current thoughts and a past action. In other words, it is a tension born of hindsight (regret, guilt, anxiety, uncertainty) and it is so unsettling that it can only be resolved through changing how a person thinks about a past event, and/or changing how others thinks about it and/ or changing behaviour in order to create greater congruence (less dissonance) between what one believe one should have done and what one actually did. For example, a person who buys a new computer may be very happy with his purchase but this mental satisfaction will be threatened if he finds the same computer at discounted price in a different store later. To re-establish peace of mind he must either convince himself that, for example, the first store will give him better long-term service, or convince others that it was worth paying a bit extra, or aim to take the machine back for a refund in order to benefit from the cheaper offer.


However, Festinger's concept of cognitive dissonance is a disembodied one. In other words, discomfort is mediated through thoughts and socially directed actions. But Festinger does not focus on the possibility that cognitive dissonance, especially where it is prolonged and/or where a person is unable to resolve the dissonance, may produce self-directed behaviours and, perhaps, in severe cases of mental conflict or disturbance, even stereotypical activities. It is also, as previously stated, a backward focused process whereby it is the past event that is causing dissonance in the present moment. In these respects, Festinger's concept does not include the idea that mental discomfort might also be produced by a forward focused process. In other words, presently occurring cognition may become contradicted by a suddenly changed situation. In this case, an eagerly expected, desired or anticipated event will produce mental discomfort if the situation suddenly alters so that it no longer supports those expectations, desires or anticipations. For example, a gambler who strongly believes his horse is going to win, will experience sudden discomfort if the leading animal bet upon falls just ahead of the finish line. The sudden thwarting of a positively anticipated outcome would create mental discomfort as two opposing cognitive-behavioural systems (celebration v. disappointment) are momentarily in balance. As a result, a self-directed action would be highly likely to follow as a means to reducing this stress so that a transition towards the most adaptive response to external events can emerge. In some instances, where self-directed behaviour fails to reduce tension sufficiently then an outward aggression or anger will be expressed but at this point the mental tension is broken completely and no forward focused dissonance would be experienced thereafter.


If displacement behaviour can be viewed as a forward focused behaviour which serves to adapt cognition and behaviour to a newly emerged reality, and if cognitive dissonance is viewed as a backward process of mediating discomfort after the new reality has settled and become accepted, then it is rational for these concepts to be understood as part of a larger process of homeostasis, whereby external stimuli and internal physiological responses are mediated. If displacement behaviour facilitates cognitive and behavioural acclimatisation to the unfolding present (e.g. against all expectation the horse lost the race), then cognitive dissonance facilitates attitudinal adjustment to the gambler's newly established relationship to the world which cannot be changed in any way other than how s/he frames it to himself ('oh well, easy come, easy go!'). In other words, both processes serve an adaptive process of reconciling self to world but via differing means: one utilising physical self-directed contact as a means to reducing the initial stress after a thwarted expectation and the second involving mental reframing as the pain endured is slowly accepted and even positively regarded.


As a final note, it is important to add that displacement behaviour and cognitive dissonance have one further aspect in common: they serve to manage a situation that cannot be reversed in time nor negated destructively. In other words, these processes are concerned with how to tolerate and adapt to the world rather than destroy it in rage or retreat into psychotic fantasy or enter a frozen catatonic state.


References
  Festinger, L. (1962) Cognitive dissonance. Scientific American, Vol 207(4), 93-107